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ON "PROTECTING THE
ORDINARY INVESTOR"
Ralph K. Winter*
We are presently engaged in yet another round in the almost cen-
tury-old debate about how the law should protect investors in large
publicly-traded corporations.1 Changes in corporate law recom-
mended by the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Pro-
ject purport to remedy perceived deficiencies in existing state
corporate codes.2 One such change would increase the liability of cor-
porate directors and officers for mismanagement.3 Proposals abound
for amending federal securities laws to hamper or facilitate hostile
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Professor (Adjunct) of Law,
Yale University. The author would like to thank Roberta Romano, George T. Conway, III and
Robert J. Giuffra, Jr. for their helpful suggestions.
1. The classic study of the separation of ownership from control in the corporation is A.
BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933). Another
influential contribution is Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). The need for a federal corporation
code is a perennial issue in corporate law reform. A leading advocate of such a code was
Professor Cary, who characterized Delaware as leading a "race for the bottom" that left
shareholders easy prey to self-dealing management. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974). I first criticized this view in Winter,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251
(1977); see also Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REv.
709 (1987); Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 225 (1985).
2. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Drafts Nos. 2 & 3, 1984); PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985);
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS; see The ALI's
Corporate Governance Proposals: Law and Economics, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513 (1984); Scott,
Corporation Law and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 927 (1983).
3. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985). Tentative Draft No. 4, § 4.01(a)(1) describes the director's
duty of care as a duty "to make, or cause to be made, such inquiry as the director or officer
reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances." This language replaced earlier
language in Tentative Draft No. I that had been strongly criticized by the Business Roundtable
and some scholars as a marked change in existing law. See J. SELIGMAN, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT 27-32 (1986). Tentative
Draft No. 1, § 4.01(b), had required a director "to make reasonable inquiry when acting upon
corporate transactions" and "to be reasonably concerned with the existence and effectiveness of
monitoring programs, including law compliance programs." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1982).
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tender offers.4 Some academics claim insider trading promotes eco-
nomic efficiency and benefits shareholders. 5 Most commentators disa-
gree, but those who oppose insider trading are widely divided as to
why it is undesirable.6
Notwithstanding the breadth of disagreement among the contend-
ing forces, most participants, now as ever, apparently agree that the
debate is over means rather than ends. Most thus agree that the goal
is the protection of the investor in common shares of publicly-traded
corporations.7 It is somewhat odd that so much controversy exists in
the presence of a shared, or largely shared, goal. One cause of the
disagreement, however, is a tendency to ignore the fact that investors
are not fungible, that some investors have goals quite different from
others, that some investors are less exposed to particular kinds of risks
4. For example, the SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, which issued its report in
July 1983, proposed, among other things, closing the 13(d) window, curbing open market
purchases, requiring shareholder approval of greenmail, and the preemption of state laws
inhibiting changes in control. SEC ADVISORY COMM. ON TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SEC (July 8, 1983). Members of Congress subsequently sought
unsuccessfully to pass legislation encompassing many of the Advisory Committee's proposals.
See Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984, H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H4357
(daily ed. May 22, 1984). Increased calls for changes in the Williams Act followed the Oct. 19,
1987 "crash" in the stock market. See S. REP. No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (report of
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs filed Dec. 17, 1987 on disclosure of
accumulations of stock and conduct of tender offers).
5. The leading proponent of this view is Dean Henry Manne. See H. MANNE, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
6. See, e.g., W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
(1979) (fairness requires that shareholders trade on the basis of equal information); Brudney,
Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 322 (1979) (insider trading raises cost of capital by deterring investment in stock
market); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production
of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309, 332-33 (insider trading may create incentive for
managers to increase volatility of a firm's stock price and delay release of financial information to
the market); Scott, Insider Trading: Rule l0b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 801 (1980) (laws against insider trading are needed to protect firms' investment in
information). These arguments are analyzed in Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
7. Compare Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979) (rules
permitting defensive tactics enhance shareholder wealth) with Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1164
(1981) (managerial passivity to tender offers increases shareholder welfare) [hereinafter Proper
Role of a Target's Management]. Lipton also argues, however, that directors responding to
tender offers have the right to consider the interests of various noninvestor groups such as
employees, customers, suppliers and communities. Lipton, Takeover Expert Proposes Uniform
State Statute, NEW YORK LAW. J., March 21, 1988, at 21, col. 5. The Delaware Supreme Court
has held that, in addition to considering shareholder wealth, directors may consider the impact
of a takeover on other "constituencies," such as employees and the community. Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
Protecting the Ordinary Investor
than others, and, most important, that some perform different market
functions than others.
In this lecture I propose to differentiate, in a somewhat arbitrary yet
analytically helpful way, between four types of investors, and then to
consider various issues of corporate and securities law in light of the
interests and functions of the different investors. I will style the inves-
tors the "Ordinary Investor," the "Speculator," the "Institutional
Investor," and the "Entrepreneur in the Market for Management Con-
trol." These distinctions aie arbitrary because overlap exists between
the categories. Moreover, these definitions are not based on how par-
ticular investors behave, but on the market functions different kinds of
investors perform. Thus, some who consider themselves Ordinary
Investors most definitely are Speculators as defined in this lecture.
This approach stems from the assumption that the goal of securities
law is to maximize the efficiency of capital markets, and that this goal
requires investment decisions to be categorized by the market function
such decisions perform rather than by the self-description investors
adopt. "Protection" of investors by legal rules is justified where the
efficiency of the market functions they perform is enhanced. Where
such "protection" avoids losses by certain investors but the losses are
no more than the inevitable outcome of competitive markets, such
"protection" is likely to reduce rather than to enhance efficiency.
I conclude that the investor least in need of more legal protection is
the Ordinary Investor who holds a diversified portfolio and follows a
buy-and-hold strategy, and that proposals for further regulation
appear principally designed to protect either inefficient speculators or
incumbent management.
I. CATEGORIES OF INVESTOR
A. The Ordinary Investor
The "Ordinary Investor," also known as the "average small inves-
tor" or the "individual investor," is the "Mom" and "Apple Pie" of
the arcane world of corporate law and securities regulation.' Few
would suggest that protecting the interests of Ordinary Investors is
8. Protecting the ordinary, average, public, or small investor has been a focus of courts. See,
e.g., Schlesinger Inv. Partnership v. Fluor Corp., 671 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Williams
Act was meant to protect the ordinary investor"); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("prospectuses [filed under Securities Act of 1933] should
be intelligible to the average small investor"). The goal of investor protection has also been
shared by Congress, see, eg., H.IL REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) (legislative history of
Securities Acts); H.RL REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (same), and scholars, see, eg.,
Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REV. 297,
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second to any other legal goal. Many also believe that Ordinary Inves-
tors are the most vulnerable of all investors to fraud, mismanagement,
insider trading, and the like.9
I describe Ordinary Investors as those who seek profit from invest-
ments by capital appreciation of shares, dividends derived from corpo-
rate growth, or interest on long-term corporate debt. The market
function performed by these investors is to provide capital to equity
and long-term debt markets.
Ordinary Investors do not seek to profit from outsmarting the mar-
ket and buying low and selling high. The costs of acquiring and
digesting information to monitor particular companies with a view to
frequent trading will exceed the benefits and will put their capital at
risk. Therefore, Ordinary Investors follow a buy-and-hold strategy
with a diversified portfolio, either of individual stocks and bonds or
shares of mutual funds or both.
Diversification greatly reduces the vulnerability of Ordinary Inves-
tors to risk. Systematic risk, or risk that applies more or less across
the board to particular categories of investment, can be reduced by
diversifying among categories-investment, debt, equity, real estate-
so as to acquire a portfolio with risks that roughly offset (to the degree
possible) each other. Unsystematic risk, namely, risk that is idiosyn-
cratic, or largely so, to particular firms, can be reduced by diversifica-
tion so that the disasters or great fortune that individual firms
encounter are also offset.o The ability to hold a portfolio that diversi-
fies against such risks is a critical efficiency because it allows small
investors to participate in the capital market with relative safety at low
information cost." This diversification, of course, increases the
amount of capital Ordinary Investors provide to the market.
Under a buy-and-hold strategy, Ordinary Investors buy and sell
only in four circumstances. The first is when their disposable income
increases, and they want to increase the size of their portfolios. The
second is when they need more disposable income and sell. The third
is when they determine that a change in their diversification between
categories of investments is desirable. The fourth is when they are
298 (1974) (considering role "substantive requirement of fairness ought to play in providing
additional protection to the public shareholders of a merging subsidiary").
9. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Toward Undistracted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate
Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1693, 1733-35 (1985) (current takeover rules discriminate against
"unsophisticated shareholders"); Brudney, supra note 6, at 346.
10. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 123-26 (2d ed.
1984).
11. Id. at 140-50.
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offered a substantial premium for particular shares in a control trans-
action such as a hostile tender offer. In the case of such a premium, a.
buy-and-hold strategy may be undesirable either because it prevents a
takeover and precludes receipt of the premium, or because the share-
holder may later be frozen out at a price less than that of the tender
offer.
So far as Ordinary Investors are concerned, the law's goal should be
to maximize the value of their investments. This will maintain confi-
dence in the equity market and induce more capital held by Ordinary
Investors into that market.
Certainly, many individual investors who consider themselves
"ordinary" do not follow a diversified, buy-and-hold strategy. How-
ever, for reasons discussed later with regard to legal rules concerning
mismanagement, good arguments may be made that the law should
not treat them as Ordinary Investors.
B. The Speculator
The second category of investor is the Speculator.12 Speculators
seek financial gain by shifting between categories of investments in
anticipation of changes in systematic risk. Within categories of invest-
ments they seek gain by outsmarting the market and buying shares at
a low price and then selling high, or short-selling high and buying low.
They do this by generating, at a cost, information about particular
companies and then acting on that information based on their best
judgment. In a real sense, Speculators make bets about particular
companies and thus about the incidence of unsystematic risk. This is
costly in an out-of-pocket sense as well as in the investment of human
capital, and Speculators must produce gains exceeding those costs to
remain in the market.
The economic function performed by Speculators is to bring effi-
ciency to debt or equity markets by ensuring that the market price of
stocks or bonds reflects the intrinsic value of the company based upon
the best information and judgment available at any given moment.1 3
12. The most prominent Speculator, until his fall in the recent insider-trading scandal, was
Ivan Boesky, who described the arbitrage business in I. BOESKY, MERGER MANIA:
ARBITRAGE-WALL STREET'S BEsr-KEPT MONEY-MAKING SECRET (1985); see also Henry,
Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 466 (1971); The Place of
Arbitrageurs in Mergers and Acquisitions, MERGERS & AcQuISITIONS, July-Aug. 1986, at 24;
Rubin, Arbitrage, 32 Bus. LAW. 1315 (1977).
13. See Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549
(1984); Grossman & Stiglitz, Information and Competitive Price Systems, 66 AM. ECON. REV.
246 (1976).
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This is, of course, a critically important function because the more
accurately share price corresponds to intrinsic value, the less risk there
will be for the Ordinary Investor. Moreover, although Speculators are
largely indifferent to whether particular corporations prosper or perish
so long as they predict their fortunes accurately, their actions tend to
move corporate assets to their most highly valued use and to reduce
unsystematic risk. Where Speculators correctly perceive a corporation
as structured or managed in a poor fashion, they will sell or avoid its
stock or bonds until their price reflects the greater risk, thereby
enhancing the chances of a wealth-increasing takeover. If Speculators
correctly anticipate corporate decline, the size of the actual decline
may well be reduced by preemptive takeovers. (As discussed below,
legal rules encouraging speculation based on prospects of a takeover
may be inefficient.) This benefits Ordinary Investors by reducing
unsystematic risk. If Speculators are successful in creating an efficient
market, therefore, Ordinary Investors will make debt or equity a
larger part of their portfolio.
The goal of corporate or securities law with regard to the Speculator
should be to allow those who are best at buying low and selling high,
or selling high and buying low, to profit and to allow those who do the
worst to suffer loses. The law should view Speculators as competitors
in a free market and allow those investing in the production of accu-
rate information to keep their profits so that further investment in
wealth generating information is made. This is so even if the losing
Speculators may be small investors who consider themselves ordinary.
Protecting such investors makes the market less efficient and reduces
gains to the real Ordinary Investor.
C. The Institutional Investor
The third category of investor is the Institutional Investor. 4 Like
the Ordinary Investor, this investor seeks gain from capital apprecia-
tion and income based on corporate growth, and protects itself from
systematic and unsystematic risk through diversification. The Institu-
tional Investor's market function is to provide capital to equity mar-
14. Institutional Investors have become increasingly important in corporate law. In 1933,
when the federal securities laws were enacted, institutions owned less than 8.5% of the
outstanding stock on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). By 1970, institutional
ownership of corporate stock had reached 17.5%. In 1987, it was estimated that institutions
owned more than 30% of all corporate shares and more than 50% of the shares of NYSE
companies. J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING
SYSTEM 6 (1987). See generally Kelly, The New Dominant Investor, 9 DIRECTORS & BOARDS,
Summer 1985, at 15; Heard, Institutional Investors Are Flexing Their Muscles, Legal Times, Oct.
24, 1983, at 11, col. 1.
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kets in large blocks. Indeed, some institutions, such as pension or
mutual funds, are conduits by which the Ordinary Investor partici-
pates in the capital market. However, the Institutional Investor is
large enough so that its information cost per share is much less than
that of the Ordinary Investor, and it is much more able to accumulate
and to act on information relevant to the futures of particular firms.
As an investor that seeks to minimize unsystematic risk by generating
information about particular companies, the Institutional Investor
overlaps with the Speculator. However, unlike the Speculator, the
Institutional Investor is not indifferent to whether corporations gener-
ally prosper or decline because its primary purpose is to increase its
worth through the capital appreciation of, and income derived from,
its holdings. The goal of the law with regard to the Institutional
Investor is thus largely the same as with regard to the Ordinary
Investor.
D. The Entrepreneur in the Market for Management Control
The fourth category of investor is the "Entrepreneur in the Market
for Management Control."15 This investor seeks capital gains by
purchasing control of a firm and thereafter increasing its value as a
going concern. It may restructure the firm financially, create synergies
through consolidation of firms, or install more efficient management.
The essential economic function of the Entrepreneur in the Market for
Management Control is thus to discipline corporate management so
that corporate assets are put to their most valued use. This investor
generates information by studying firms and determining which firms
can be increased in value by various actions. When the Entrepreneur
determines that the current share price is substantially below what it
would be if such actions were taken, the Entrepreneur will seek to
purchase a control bloc at a price exceeding current price but below a
predicted future value. This is a critically important market function.
It increases our wealth by increasing efficiency and ultimately benefit-
ing consumers. The law's goal with regard to the Entrepreneur in the
15. Much has been written about the role of the "Entrepreneur in the Market for
Management Control" in the capital markets. See, eg., Coffee, Regulating the Market for
Corporate Control. A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1145 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers,
35 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Auctions and Sunk Costs]; Easterbrook & Fischel,
Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981); Gilson,
A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Board room, supra note 7;
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); Proper Role
of a Target's Management, supra note 7.
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Market for Management Control must be to protect its property inter-
est in the information it generates, to maintain fluidity in the Market
for Management Control, and to reduce the transaction costs of corpo-
rate control transactions.
II. CATEGORIES OF INVESTORS AND RULES OF
CORPORATE LAW
I turn now to a discussion of the relationship of each category of
investor to pertinent issues of corporate or securities law. I assume
that the enforcement of these rules is costless to all investors, a debata-
ble assumption but one necessary to get us home before midnight.
A. Rules Affecting the Power of Shareholders to Direct
Corporate Affairs
Many commentators have long decried the seeming impotence of
shareholders to direct corporate conduct. 6 Over the years, the issues
on which shareholders must vote have diminished. Shareholders are
required to approve only fundamental corporate changes, such as
mergers or sales of assets, and perhaps charter amendments.' 7 Under
current state law, cumulative voting is permissive and thus unknown
in large corporations. 18 In every state, however, holders of designated
classes of stock elect directors with the legal power to conduct the
business. 9
Ordinary Investors are indifferent to whether shareholder power to
direct corporate affairs is enhanced or diminished. Diversification's
great value is that it enables shareholders to reduce the volatility of
their risk without the great costs the generation of information on par-
ticular firms entails. The diversified shareholder certainly has no
incentive to pay those costs simply to follow the affairs of particular
corporations in order to cast an intelligent proxy vote. Moreover, the
costs of collective action with other shareholders are so prohibitive
16. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 1, at 4-5, 66-68; Friedman, SEC Regulation of
Corporate Proxies, 63 HARV. L. REv. 796 (1950); Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477
(1958). For a dissenting view, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395 (1983).
17. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1983) (majority approval of shareholders needed for
merger or consolidation of domestic corporation); id. § 271 (a) (majority approval of shareholders
needed for sale of substantially all assets); id. § 242(b) (majority approval of shareholders needed
for charter amendments). Delaware does not, however, require shareholder approval of short-
form mergers. See id. § 253.
18. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 250-61 (5th ed.
1980).
19. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 18, at 140-42.
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that the right to vote is basically irrelevant to the Ordinary Investor.
That is the case even with regard to voting for directors because that
involves the same costs of information generation and collective
action. Of course, the power to vote for directors has a value in the
market for management control. Shares with high voting power thus
trade at a higher price than shares with low voting power. However,
from the perspective of the Ordinary Investor, the market incorporates
the value of voting rights in the price at which shares are bought or
sold.
Putting aside speculation in the takeover market, which I discuss
later, the Speculator's interest in the power to direct corporate affairs
is also minimal. Speculators do not generally purchase stock to par-
ticipate in corporate governance. Rather, they anticipate some
favorable or unfavorable change in the corporation's fortunes and, if a
shareholders' vote is necessary to that change, approval is usually pro
forma.
The Institutional Investor has a greater interest than the Ordinary
Investor in voting power regarding change in corporate structure or
corporate charters.20 This interest arises from the Institutional Inves-
tor's lower information cost per share held in particular corporations
than the Ordinary Investor. It also has a lower cost of collective
action with other shareholders than the Ordinary Investor because it
holds much larger blocks of shares. In contrast to past behavior, some
Institutional Investors now openly oppose various management pro-
posals, in particular defensive measures against takeovers embodied in
proposed charter amendments. 21 Although to date these efforts
appear unsuccessful, the votes seem increasingly close. The Institu-
tional Investor may be directly courted by management, moreover,
and this may affect what management puts to a vote. Indeed, the sec-
ond generation of state antitakeover legislation largely allows manage-
ment to resort to certain defensive measures without seeking
shareholder approval.
Of course, the Entrepreneur in the Market for Management Control
has an interest in shares with voting rights so that the Entrepreneur
can wage a proxy fight or purchase a control bloc through a hostile
20. On voting by institutional investors, see J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, supra note 14, at
10-23.
21. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 5-14 (1986) (survey indicating increased institutional opposition to
antitakeover amendments).
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tender offer.2 2 Entrepreneurs may also have an interest in providing
for shareholder votes that complete a control transaction by, say, a
cash-out merger, and make the transaction less susceptible to litiga-
tion. They also have an interest in the ability of shareholders to vote
on fundamental changes to the extent Institutional Investors are pre-
pared to use that power to oppose defensive measures against take-
overs by management.
B. Rules Concerning Fraud and Disclosure
These rules include rules against knowing fraud, such as Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,23 the various federal
requirements concerning registration and disclosure with regard to
new offerings in the Securities Act of 1933,24 periodic reporting by
large publicly-traded corporations required by the 1934 Act,25 and dis-
closure regarding tender offers contained in the Williams Act.2 6 My
discussion of the Williams Act is subsumed in the later discussion of
defensive measures against takeovers.
The Ordinary Investor benefits indirectly from most of these rules.27
The general rule against knowing fraud guarantees that fraud in the
capital market will be deterred, and thus the risk to a particular inves-
22. Successful changes in control of major corporations by proxy fights are relatively rare. A
recent example occurred when an insurgent slate was elected to head the board of GAF
Corporation. See GAF Corp. v. Heyman, 724 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1983).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES
REGULATION--CASES AND MATERIALS 832-1092 (6th ed. 1987).
24. Section 5 of the 1933 Act prescribes detailed rules for compelling full disclosure to
investors of material financial and other information concerning new issues of securities. See
generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 92-165 (1983). Liability
provisions include: Section I 1 (liability for misstatements or omissions in registration statement
or prospectus); Section 12(1) (liability for offers or sales in violation of Section 5); Section 12(2)
(civil liability for fraud or misrepresentation in interstate sale of securities); Section 17 (criminal
liability for fraud or misrepresentation in interstate sale of securities). See generally id. at 1015-
56, 1141-50.
25. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982). See generally L. Loss,
supra note 24, at 459-509.
26. Section 14(d) of the Williams Act requires that. for the protection of shareholders, any
party making a tender offer disclose certain specified information to the issuer, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and to any exchange where the security is being traded. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(1) (1982). Section 13(d) requires any party who acquires five percent or more of a
registered security to report such acquisition and his intentions regarding the issuer. Id.
§ 78m(g). The antifraud provision contained in section 14(e) makes it unlawful to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or "to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
acts or practices" in connection with a tender offer. Id. § 78n(e). See generally M. LIPTON & E.
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS §§ 2.01-2.13 (5th ed. 1987); L. Loss, supra note
24, at 572-84.
27. The assumption that enforcement of these rules is costless is particularly important here.
If, for example, corporations must pay substantial damages to Speculators as a result of section
890
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tor can be greatly reduced through diversification.2" Fraud is a species
of unsystematic risk against which diversification provides protection,
much as insurance policies purchased for a premium reduce the cost to
a homeowner of common theft. If there were no law against knowing
fraud, the risk would be systematic; so too, if there were no law against
theft, that risk would not be insurable.
The Ordinary Investor also benefits indirectly from the registration
and disclosure requirements.29 These provide a system of universal,
systematic, reliable, and economic (cheap) disclosure. The provisions
requiring disclosure of designated information by corporations oper-
ates in a way somewhat analogous to a governmental definition of
weights and measures.3" The effect is to provide the market common
bases of information about all publicly traded corporations. The exist-
ence of a federal registration and disclosure scheme involving pre-
approval by a federal agency avoids what might be extremely costly
disclosure requirements imposed by the various states and has also
reduced litigation over the adequacy of disclosure by particular corpo-
rations.31 Reliability results from the fact that lawyers, accountants,
and other parties are at risk as well as the issuer in complying with the
registration provisions.32
10(b) actions, Ordinary Investors may be the losers. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978,
999 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
28. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argue that a rule against fraud, while not essential in a
securities market, is probably less costly than alternative methods of verifying information about
firms:
The penalty for fraud makes it more costly for low-quality firms to mimic high-quality ones
by making false disclosures. An antifraud rule imposes low or no costs on honest, high
quality firms. Thus it makes it possible for high quality firms to offer warranties at lower
cost.The informational warranty, if enforced, makes it unnecessary for buyers to verify
information or for sellers to undertake expensive certification. The expenses of offering high
quality securities go down while the expenses of passing off low quality securities rise.
Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 U. VA. L. REv.
669, 677 (1984) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Mandatory Disclosure]; see also Beaver, The
Nature of Mandated Disclosure, in SEC ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE,
REPORT TO THE SEC 618, 637-39 (1977).
29. There has been continuing debate over the merits of mandatory disclosure. See generally
Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L.
REv. 717 (1984). Professor Stigler first argued that mandatory disclosure was not only costly,
but did not significantly improve the quality of information provided to investors. Stigler, Public
Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964); see also Manne, Economic Aspects of
Required Disclosure under Federal Securities Laws, WALL STREET IN TRANSITION 23 (1974).
For a critique of this view, see Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate
Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. LAW 1 (1983).
30. See Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 28, at 700-01.
31. See id. at 697-99.
32. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 613-21; Kraakman, Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
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To be sure, the registration and disclosure scheme is controversial
because we cannot determine whether the benefits of regulation exceed
its considerable costs.3 3 Moreover, the financial information required
to be disclosed is largely historical and may not be the most relevant
evidence of corporate prospects. 34 It can be cogently argued, however,
that the required disclosure is necessary because of various "free-rider
effects" that would cause many firms to refuse to make disclosure
absent assurance that others would also do so.35 Finally, although his-
torical financial information is not the most relevant evidence of cor-
porate prospects, it nonetheless remains important and can be defined
in an understandable way that allows economical corporate compli-
ance.3 6 Although Ordinary Investors may well never read the pro-
spectuses and periodic disclosure required by the federal securities
laws, they will be indirect beneficiaries if the disclosures reduce trans-
actions costs in the equity market.
Speculators and Institutional Investors also benefit from a rule
against knowing fraud and from the registration and disclosure
required by the 1933 Act. Their benefit from the rule against knowing
fraud is somewhat more direct than that of the Ordinary Investor
because they are not diversified and thus may be more exposed to the
risk of fraud. Moreover, the required disclosure affords them a base of
reliable information from which they can generate more information
to guide their investment decisions. Greater protection against mis-
statements or omissions than now exists may be economically undesir-
able in the case of both Speculators and Institutional Investors,
however. One of the market functions of Speculators and Institutional
Investors is to make judgments about the prospects of particular cor-
porations, including corporations that may be attempting to mislead
investors. Although a rule against fraud is desirable, the law should
not create disincentives for Speculators and Institutional Investors to
collect information and make judgments regarding the likelihood of
fraud.
The Entrepreneur in the Market for Management Control also ben-
efits from the prohibition on knowing fraud because that prohibition
enhances its ability to discover overvalued stock. Moreover, the regis-
33. See Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 28, at 715 ("We cannot say that the existing
securities laws are beneficial, but we are also not confident that their probable replacements
would be better.").
34. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 23, at 159-71.
35. See Coffee, supra note 29, at 725-33; Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 28, at 680-87,
697.
36. See Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 28, at 702-03.
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tration provisions of the 1933 Act probably provide information help-
ful in determining which corporations are likely targets for a takeover.
C. Rules Concerning Self-Dealing
The general rule in American corporate law is that corporate trans-
actions benefiting management are not protected by the business judg-
ment rule, but are judged on an arms-length fairness basis.37 The
failure of these rules to prohibit all transactions benefiting manage-
ment is controversial, but the existing rules have persisted, one sus-
pects, because many such transactions are beneficial to the
corporation. Directors may well have lower information costs regard-
ing a particular corporation than outside parties and may be able to
identify and execute transactions that, while profitable to them, are
nevertheless the best available to the corporation. If the directors
could not profit, such transactions might never occur. Directors with
widespread contacts in the commercial world are valuable to corpora-
tions seeking profitable business opportunities, but such directors can-
not be sensibly required to refer every opportunity they come upon to
a single corporation rather than claim it for themselves or for another
corporation on whose board they serve. Indeed, the benefits to corpo-
rations of access to widespread commercial contacts would be severely
limited by such a rule. To be sure, there is a risk of self-dealing that
may damage the corporation, but such losses must be measured
against the cost of prohibiting all such transactions including those
that are beneficial.3" The rule evaluating self-dealing transactions by
the standards of arms-length bargaining thus seeks to distinguish
between beneficial and harmful transactions.39
37. See generally J. BISHOP, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 3.03-.10
(1981 & Supp. 1987); W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 18, at 563-712.
38. See Winter, supra note 1, at 277-80.
39. Easterbrook and Fischel characterize judicially enforced fiduciary rules as follows:
Acting as a standard-form penalty clause in every agency contract, the elastic contours of
the fiduciary principle reflect the difficulty that contracting parties have in anticipating when
and how their interests may diverge. Socially optimal fiduciary rules approximate the
bargain that investors and agents would strike if they were able to dicker at no cost. Such
rules preserve the gains resulting from the delegation of authority and the division of labor
while limiting the ability of agents to further their own interests at the expense of investors.
The existence of such "off-the-rack" rules reduces the costs of transacting and of enforcing
restrictions on the agent's powers.
Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1982); see also
Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959, 975 (1980). Other mecha-
nisms for monitoring managers include market controls (i.e., employment, product, capital, and
corporate control), see Winter, supra note 1, 262-66, and organizational controls (e.g., outside
directors, accountants, investment bankers), see Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 312-15 (1983).
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The Ordinary Investor is probably protected by a legal rule of the
kind described above because the rule against self-dealing increases
value. Like fraud, however, self-dealing is an unsystematic risk
against which one can diversify.
Arguably some Speculators might benefit from rules that afford
greater protection against self-dealing. Whether the benefits to corpo-
rations from such transactions outweigh the losses, even if they greatly
outweigh the losses, is irrelevant to Speculators. They are not inter-
ested in the growth of corporate value so much as predicting changes
in value, up or down, among particular corporations. However,
greater protection should not be afforded Speculators because their
market function includes making judgments about the quality of man-
agement, and those Speculators who are best at detecting honest man-
agement should be able to reap a reward as an incentive to make
accurate judgments. A rule prohibiting all corporate transactions
from which management profited would thus injure Ordinary Inves-
tors and prevent efficient Speculators from making gains solely to pro-
tect inefficient Speculators from suffering losses.
Institutional Investors are diversified against the risk of self-dealing.
Institutional Investors also have a greater interest in benefitting from
the appreciation of their value of their holdings than in speculating
against particular cases of self-dealing. Present law is thus efficient so
far as this investor is concerned.
The Entrepreneur in the Market for Management Control is not
affected by such rules except where the self-dealing involves defensive
measures against takeovers, which I discuss separately.
D. Rules Concerning Mismanagement
Existing law regarding the liability of directors and officers for mis-
management tends to be stated in the language of ordinary negligence.
In practice, until recently at least, mismanagement has rarely resulted
in liability except where a director or officer has paid virtually no
attention to the affairs of the corporation, has consciously avoided
learning about the affairs of the corporation, or has engaged in con-
duct that puts the corporation in a no-win situation.' This limited
liability in practice results from the so-called business judgment rule
40. "The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been held liable
in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small
number of needles in a very large haystack." Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099
(1968). Professor Bishop found only four such cases. Id. at 1099-1100. The American Law
Institute draft report on corporate governance added only two cases to this list. PRINCIPLES OF
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that protects directors and officers so long as the business decisions in
question were made in good faith and did not involve self-dealing."g
The rule has not been as protective in practice where directors and
officers of banks are concerned,42 and the recent Delaware decision in
the case of Smith v. Van Gorkom43 may signal a generally less protec-
tive attitude among the judiciary.'
The Ordinary Investor benefits from a business judgment rule pro-
tective of management because management is likely to be more risk
averse than a diversified investor.45 The value of an investment is
determined by weighing probable returns and the volatility of the risk.
Even where there is a seventy-five percent chance of a very high
return, a twenty-five percent chance of a substantial loss may cause a
risk averse person to select an investment with prospects of very mod-
est gain if the chances of loss are also much less. The diversified inves-
tor, however, is assured that the high losses among some companies
will be offset by the even greater gains among the rest. That investor
therefore prefers the most valuable investment because diversification
eliminates the volatility of the risk. Management, however, has a non-
diversified investment of human capital in one company and may pre-
fer a less valuable but also less volatile investment.
Consider the following example of a choice between two business
decisions having different values and different risks.4 6
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01, at
39 n.17 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985).
41. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("under the business judgment rule
director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("A board of directors enjoys
a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be
attributed to any rational business purpose. A court under such circumstances will not substitute
its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment.").
42. See, eg., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
43. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
44. In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court strictly applied the business judgment rule,
stating that the determination of whether a business judgment is an "informed one" in a cash-out
merger turned on "whether the directors have informed themselves 'prior to making a business
decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.'" Id. at 872 (quoting
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812). The directors in this case, who relied only on the company's
chairman for the valuation of the merger, had not followed the increasingly common practice of
obtaining a fairness opinion from an investment bank. See Note, Investment Bankers' Fairness
Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 9(YALE L.J. 119 (1986). Commentators have been
critical of the Van Gorkom decision. See eg., Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the
Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAw. 1437 (1985).
45. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982).
46. This example is adapted from W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 208-09 (3d ed. 1988).
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Estimated Probability Outcome
of Outcome Profit or Loss Value
INVESTMENT A
.4 +15 6.0
.4 + 1 .4
.2 -13 -2.6
1.0 3.8
INVESTMENT B
.4 + 8 3.2
.4 + 1 .4
.2 0 0
1.0 3.6
A is a more valuable investment than B, but the management of a
single company is unlikely to choose it over B because twenty percent
of the time ruin will result. Management's human capital is not diver-
sified, but is "invested" in that firm. An Ordinary Investor, on the
other hand, with a portfolio of many companies that face such a deci-
sion, will not fear the twenty percent chance of disaster in choice A
because forty percent of the companies choosing A will encounter a
bonanza.
Legal rules penalizing managers for taking good faith risks will thus
work against the interest of the ordinary shareholder by increasing
management's risk averseness. Indeed, this is probably the reason that
the business judgment rule has, over the years, been so protective of
management. Indeed, after the Van Gorkom decision, Delaware
amended its code to allow corporations to limit the liability of direc-
tors for breaches of the duty of care.47 The somewhat different rule
applied to banks may well be the exception that proves the worthiness
of the general rule. Banks are highly leveraged institutions (depositors
being debt creditors) and the law is correct in reducing the volatility of
the risks they take.
As in the case of rules concerning the duty of loyalty, some Specula-
tors would be helped by a less protective business judgment rule.
However, only those Speculators who are the least efficient at distin-
guishing between good and poor management would be helped.
Again, there is no reason to afford poor Speculators special protection
from mismanagement. The risk is one they encountered voluntarily
and can avoid simply by diversifying and not speculating. Moreover,
efficient Speculators who detect weak management may well cause
share price to drop in anticipation of mismanagement and cause a pre-
47. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986).
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emptive takeover before truly damaging mismanagement actually
occurs. Finally, a rule protecting the inefficient Speculator will
increase management's risk averseness and thus cause it to choose
business strategies that are suboptimal from the Ordinary Investor's
point of view.
Institutional Investors probably share the views of Ordinary Inves-
tors on this issue. They are protected by diversification in the same
way as the Ordinary Investor and gain from legal rules reducing man-
agement's risk averseness. They are also in a much better position to
protect against mismanagement because of lower information costs per
share.
The Entrepreneur in the Market for Management Control has little
interest in legal rules concerning mismanagement, because such an
investor seeks to profit from mismanagement by purchasing control
and providing better management.
E. Rules Concerning Defensive Measures Against Takeovers
Academic, judicial, and political debate continues over the propri-
ety of defensive measures against takeovers. It seems clear that where
the purpose of such maneuvers is solely to protect management in
their jobs, such measures are illegal.4 8 Disagreement persists, however,
over whether defensive measures are beneficial to investors because
they frequently result in bidding and auctions that increase the share
price paid to target shareholders when the takeover is completed.49
Whether one can usefully distinguish between defensive measures
designed to entrench management and those intended to cause auc-
tions, however, seems doubtful. Management rarely acts without the
advice of skilled counsel, and it takes rather little skill to arrange
affairs so that the appearance of trying to benefit shareholders is cre-
48. See, eg., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985)
("Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting in its own interests in a takeover
,.. there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the
protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred."); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548,
554 (Del. 1964) ("if the board has acted solely or primarily because of the desire to perpetuate
themselves in office, the use of corporate funds for such purposes is improper.")
49. Compare Proper Role of a Target's Management, supra note 7 (arguing for rule
prohibiting defensive tactics by target management) and Auctions and Sunk Costs supra note 15
(auctions provide small if not negative allocational benefits) with Bebchuk, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028 (1982) (post-bid delays may deter
searching, but have countervailing positive effect of promoting beneficial auctions) and Gilson,
Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51
(1982) (auctions can increase social wealth).
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ated. Nevertheless, I will assume for purposes of discussion that such a
distinction is viable.
The strongest argument against defensive measures leading to auc-
tions is that raiders have high information costs in identifying compa-
nies as appropriate targets. This means less information will be
generated and fewer tender offers will be made if the information gen-
erated by the first bidder must be shared with a competing bidder who
bore no information cost.5 ° In a market without the Williams Act or
state antitakeover legislation, a raider might make an offer with so
short a period for acceptance that competing offers were effectively
precluded, the fabled "Saturday Night Special." In a market with
such regulation, raiders must signal their intentions well in advance
and disclose some of the information they have collected. Competing
raiders thus have potential targets costlessly identified, and some
explicit information given to them free. They are then able to make a
higher offer. Consequently, opponents of auctions argue that fewer
tender offers will be made because the costs of generating information
must be borne entirely by the first offeror while the rewards of such
information are shared with others. Where an auction is likely, there-
fore, potential raiders will have less profit motive to collect relevant
information and to make hostile tender offers.
Conversely, proponents of auctions argue that preventing Saturday
Night Specials allows shareholders to benefit from higher bids by com-
peting raiders. They believe that the higher prices paid for shares as a
consequence of auctions is larger than the losses suffered from the
reduction of the number of tender offers. They also argue that inves-
tors can identify potential targets in advance and thereby benefit from
ensuing auctions.5"
The Ordinary Investor appears not to gain from rules that impede
the first bidder and lead to auctions. The diversified shareholder has
interests in both raiders and targets, and what it may gain through
increased bids at auctions for target companies is precisely matched by
what it loses as a raider. Moreover, the legal and other costs of auc-
tions must be borne, leading to a net loss for the Ordinary Investor.
Efficient Speculators gain from auctions. If a Speculator identifies
the most attractive potential targets under legal rules permitting auc-
tions, then it will profit by investing in companies that are ultimately
the subject of successful (if the takeover is defeated, share prices may
drop substantially) takeovers. It may be, however, that the identifica-
50. See Auctions and Sunk Costs, supra note 15, at 3-7.
51. See Bebchuk, supra note 49, at 1035-38.
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tion of likely successful takeover targets by Speculators does not con-
tribute to the efficiency of capital markets. As argued above, one
function of Speculators is to cause the price of poorly managed compa-
nies to fall. If Speculators can anticipate where auctions will occur,
they may further reduce the number of desirable takeovers by increas-
ing the price raiders must pay.
The Institutional Investor shares the view of the Ordinary Investor.
Given its diversification, auctions impose costs but offer no benefits
because the gains to target shareholders from costly auctions are offset
by losses to raider shareholders. The Institutional Investor would ben-
efit only if it divested itself of stock in potential raiders and loaded up
with stock of potential targets, or in short abandoned diversification
and became a Speculator. The growing resistance of certain large pen-
sion plans to various defensive tactics, such as poison pills, tends to
demonstrate that the Institutional Investor's interest in capital appre-
ciation is paramount.
The Entrepreneur in the Market for Management Control has an
interest in avoiding auctions and in protecting property rights in the
information it has generated at great cost.52 It has no interest in see-
ing Speculators or competing bidders profit from its efforts.
This view prevails, however, only in unregulated conditions. Under
present regulations, Section 13(d) of the Williams Act requires that
any raider with holdings in a company equalling five percent of shares
must announce its presence on the scene.53 Entrepreneurs may pres-
ently have an interest in seeing that Speculators acquire blocs of stock
so that the Entrepreneurs can remain under the five percent level and
yet have some assurance of later quickly picking up the stock. This of
course may create an insider trading problem.
F. Rules Concerning Insider Trading
The rationale for prohibiting gains through insider trading is highly
controversial. Traditionalists argue that insider trading is unfair to
other traders. 4 More recently, some commentators have proposed
52. See Auctions and Sunk Costs, supra note 15, at 3-7.
53. See generally L. Loss, supra note 24, at 573.
54. See, eg., Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 VA. L. Rtv. 1425, 1439 (1967) ("Even if we found that unfettered insider
trading would bring an economic gain, we might still forego that gain in order to secure a stock
market and intracorporate relationship that satisfy such noneconomic goals as fairness, just
rewards and integrity.").
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the rationale that insider information is the property of the corpora-
tion or its agent and should not be misappropriated. 55
Certainly the unfairness rationale makes no sense with regard to
Ordinary Investors. They buy or sell according to current cash posi-
tion or need to change the ratio of various categories of investments in
their portfolio. It is hard to see how trading by an insider injures such
investors. Their decision to buy or sell is based on current cash posi-
tion or portfolio considerations and not on judgments as to a com-
pany's future. The transaction is thus independent of the confidential
information. Moreover, Ordinary Investors buy or sell in a diversified
manner, and the effect on share prices of insider buying is offset by the
effect on share prices of those insiders who are selling. Finally, it
should be noted that insider trading makes share prices conform more
closely to intrinsic value, a function that largely benefits Ordinary
Investors.
The interests of Ordinary Investors are quite different, however, if
the vice of insider trading is the misappropriation of corporation prop-
erty, because such a misappropriation reduces the value of the corpo-
ration. Although controversial, the misappropriation theory56 as a
rationale for the prohibition of insider trading deserves consideration.
In many of the more celebrated cases, insider trading had the potential
or effect of injuring the corporation. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
Co.,57 for example, insider trading risked disclosure of the mining
strike that might have prevented the corporation from acquiring the
necessary mineral rights. In United States v. Chiarella," the identifi-
cation of targets from confidential documents had the effect of making
takeovers by the raider, for whom the printer was indirectly working,
more expensive. To be sure, one might argue that contract law and
55. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 331; Scott, supra note 6, at 814-15.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981) (securities trader who
fraudulently misappropriated confidential information for personal gain held criminally liable for
breaching duty owed to his employer's clients "whose takeover plans were keyed to target
company stock prices fixed by market forces, not artificially inflated through purchases by
purloiners of confidential information"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). The Supreme Court
recently deadlocked 4 to 4 on whether former Wall Street Journal editor R. Foster Winans could
be convicted of violating Rule lOb-5 by trading on the basis of confidential publication schedules
he misappropriated from his employer. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). A bill
on insider trading has been introduced in the U.S. Senate that would codify in large part the
misappropriation theory. The Insider Trader Proscriptions Act of 1987, S. 1380, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S8247 (daily ed. June 17, 1987).
57. 401 F.2d 833, 843 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
58. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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the principles of fiduciary obligations afford a civil remedy.5 9 How-
ever, civil remedies may lead to underenforcement because the costs of
private enforcement outweigh the benefits to particular companies.
Where the transaction costs prevent the efficient private enforcement
of contracts, an appropriate function of government is to reduce those
costs.
Some Speculators and Institutional Investors can be harmed by
insider trading, but again the inefficient bear the loss. Both are injured
only because inside traders are more efficient at performing the market
function of Speculators and Institutional Investors, namely moving
the price of a company's stock in the most accurate direction. Not all
Speculators and Institutional Investors are hurt, moreover. Efficient
Speculators and Institutional Investors may notice unexplained trad-
ing in a company's shares, accurately identify it as a consequence of
insider trading, and then trade themselves. So fat as performing the
market function of the Speculator or Institutional Investor is con-
cerned, therefore, insider trading is good rather than bad.
So far as Entrepreneurs in the Market for Management Control are
concerned, they probably do not like insider trading on the basis of
confidential information as to their intentions, at least in unregulated
conditions. In such circumstances, Entrepreneurs would have to pay
more to effectuate the takeover.' In the presence of Section 13(d),
however, Entrepreneurs in the Market for Management Control may
well desire that Speculators purchase stock in target companies in
anticipation of its takeover attempt. This would tend to concentrate
shares in large blocs without the Entrepreneur having to comply with
Section 13(d).
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, each of the classes of investors I have described performs a
market function necessary to the efficiency of equity and capital mar-
kets. The goal of the law should be to allow those investors to perform
those functions most efficiently even where that permissive attitude
will necessarily result in some losses. Losses are an inevitable aspect
of competitive markets, and their existence is not evidence of the need
for more protective legal rules. That will simply make markets less
59. See Note, Insider Trading by Intermediaries: A Contract Remedy for Acquirers' Increased
Costs of Takeovers, 97 YALE L.J. 115 (1987).
60. See Givoly & Palmon, Insider Trading and the Exploitation of Insider Information: Some
Empirical Evidence, 58 J. Bus. 69 (1985); Keown & Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and
Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855 (1981).
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efficient and cause other investors to subsidize inefficient members of
one class.
Moreover, a credible argument exists that Ordinary Investors and
Institutional Investors are much less vulnerable to the risks with
which the law has been traditionally concerned than either the Specu-
lator or the Entrepreneur in the Market for Management Control. If
so, the view that corporate and securities law needs a wholesale over-
haul is meritless. Indeed, many proposals for reform seem designed to
reduce the risks for Speculators at a cost to Ordinary and Institutional
Investors. Alterations in rules concerning the duty of loyalty and duty
of care fall into that category, as do rules that allow defensive tactics
against takeovers designed to create auctions. Speculators encounter
risks voluntarily, however, and seemingly can avoid those risks by
diversifying and following a buy-and-hold strategy. Finally, Specula-
tors are competitors whose function is to make capital markets effi-
cient in pricing. The ensuing competition makes losses an inevitable
part of that efficiency.
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